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Renfrew v. Loysen: Fee Awards for
Attorneys Appearing In Propria
Persona
The California Court of Appeal for the Second District recently
held in Renfrew v. Loysen' that an attorney may be awarded attorney's
fees pursuant to a representation agreement when the attorney appears
in propria persona.2 Yvonne Renfrew, a licensed attorney, rendered
legal services to Joanne Loysen pursuant to a contract that provided
for payment of attorney's fees.' The parties agreed that if either should
initiate litigation regarding fees, the prevailing party would be entitled
to attorney's fees for that proceeding, in addition to any award on
the merits.4 Renfrew, represented by the Law Offices of Yvonne M.
Renfrew, prevailed at trial in an action to collect legal fees owed to
her by Loysen.5 A post judgment motion by Renfrew for attorney's
fees pursuant to section 1717 of the California Civil Code was denied.
Fees are generally awarded pursuant to statute, or contract under
section 1717. 7 The trial court denied the motion on the basis of a
long-standing general rule that attorney-litigants are not entitled to
attorney's fees.' The rationale for the rule is that attorneys appearing
in propria persona incur no attorney's fees.9 The court of appeal
1. 175 Cal. App. 3d 1105, 222 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1985).
2. In propria persona, also referred to as pro se, is defined as "in one's own person,"
and is used in the context of attorney self-representation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 404 (5th
ed. 1983).




7. See infra note 19 and accompanying text (section 1717 printed in pertinent part).
8. Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1107-08, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 414; see infra notes 36-47
and accompanying text (legal background of prior common law rule).
9. Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1107-08, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
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reversed the decision of the trial court and awarded attorney's fees
to Renfrew.' 0 In reversing, the appellate court attached no significance
to the fact that attorney Renfrew incurred no legal fee." Part I of
this note sets forth the facts of the case and the decision of the court.'2
Part II discusses both the legal background of the former common
law rule denying attorney's fees to attorneys representing themselves,
and recent developments that led to the decision in Renfrew.' Part
III examines the legal ramifications of the ruling by focusing upon
the types of actions for which attorneys may be awarded fees."' In
addition, the jurisdictional scope of the ruling will be addressed.'"
I. Tm CASE
A. The Facts
Yvonne Renfrew, a licensed attorney, rendered legal services to
Joanne Loysen pursuant to a representation agreement.' 6 The agree-
ment provided that if either party initiated litigation concerning
attorney's fees, the prevailing party would be entitled not only to the
attorney's fees that were the basis of the action, but also those fees
associated with subsequent actions for recovery.' 7 Renfrew prevailed
in an action to collect legal fees from Loysen.18 A post judgment
motion for the additional fees was filed pursuant to section 1717 of
the California Civil Code.'9 The trial court denied the motion, however,
10. Id. at 1110, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
11. See id. at 1109-10, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
12. See infra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 36-62 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1107, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Section 1717 of the California Civil Code provides:
(a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's
fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce the provisions of that contract, shall
be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party
who is determined to be the prevailing party, whether he or she is the party specified
in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to
costs and necessary disbursements.
Where a contract provides for attorney's fees, as set forth above, such provision
shall be construed as applying to the entire contract, unless each party was represented
by counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that
representation is specified in the contract.
Reasonable attorney's fees shall be fixed by the court, upon notice and motion by
a party, and shall be an element of costs of the suit.
Attorney's fees provided for by this section shall not be subject to waiver by the
parties to any contract which is entered into after the effective date of this section.
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based upon a long-standing rule of California case law that denies




Renfrew claimed a right to attorney's fees pursuant to section 1717
of the California Civil Code. 2' Under section 1717, the court shall
award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a contract action if
the contract provides that attorney's fees are recoverable by the prevail-
ing party.22 Attorneys representing themselves, however, have tradi-
tionally been denied fees recoverable pursuant to statutory provisions.23
The court in Renfrew analyzed the origin of the case law denying
fees to attorney-litigants. 24 The court questioned the continued validity
of the 1874 case of Patterson v. Donner,2 in which the California
Supreme Court created the rule.2 6 The Renfrew court also cited dicta
in the more recent supreme court decision in Consumers Lobby Against
Monopolies v. Public Utilities Commission27 to attack the logic of
past decisions denying fees to attorneys appearing in propria persona.2"
The Renfrew court also derived support for a rule allowing fees from
the Ninth Circuit case of Ellis v. Cassidy."9 Finally, the court noted
that the California Court of Appeal for the First District had recent-
ly allowed fees for an attorney appearing in propria persona in an
inverse condemnation case.
30
Any provision in any such contract which provides for a waiver of attorney's fees
is void.
(b)(l) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the
prevailing party, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as pro-
vided in paragraph (2), the prevailing party shall be the party who is entitled to
recover costs of suit.
(2) Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settle-
ment of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section.
CAL. CiV. CODE §1717.
20. Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1107-08, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
21. Id. at 1107, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
22. CAL. CIV. CODE §1717; see supra note 19 and accompanying text (section 1717 printed
in pertinent part).
23. See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
24. Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1108, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 414. The trial court derived
the rule from the 1929 California Supreme Court case of City of Long Beach v. Sten, 206
Cal. 473, 274 P. 968 (1929). Id.
25. 48 Cal. 369 (1874).
26. Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1108, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 414; see infra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
27. 25 Cal. 3d 891, 603 P.2d 41, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1979).
28. Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1108, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (citing Consumers Lobby
at 915 n.13, 603 P.2d at 55 n.13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.13 (dicta)).
29. 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980) (cited in Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1108-09, 222
Cal. Rptr. at 414).
30. Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1109, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15 (citing Leaf v. City
of San Mateo, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1184, 198 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1984)).
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The court in Renfrew found the reasoning of the cases awarding
legal fees logical and persuasive.3' Renfrew's contract action required
time and skill for which Renfrew would have otherwise received com-
pensation.32 The loss of time available for Renfrew's regular law prac-
tice represented a loss of income. 3 The court found no justification
for allowing Loysen to escape a contractual obligation to pay legal
fees simply because Renfrew chose to appear in propria persona.
4
To deny fees would create a windfall for Loysen at the direct expense
of attorney-litigant Renfrew.35 The court therefore decided to reject
the rule created in Patterson.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Development of Early Case Law
In 1874, the California Supreme Court originated the general rule
denying attorney's fees to attorney-litigants appearing in propria per-
sona in Patterson v. Donner.36 In an action to enforce a mortgage,
an attorney representing himself sought an award of legal fees.
37
Although the mortgage contained a contractual provision allowing the
award, the fees were denied without explanation.3" In 1928, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held in City of Long Beach v. Sten" that an
attorney acting in propria persona to defend a condemnation action
could not recover legal fees.41 An award of fees was required by a
31. See Renfrew at 1109, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court did not address the situation in which attorneys are represented by a
professional law corporation owned by the attorney-litigants. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§6160-72 (professional legal corporations). The court in Leaf v. City of San Mateo noted
that if attorneys were to incur financial liability by employing a self-owned law corporation,
the attorneys would be able to recover fees if the courtroom appearance were made by a member
of the firm other than themselves. See Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1184,
1189, 198 Cal. Rptr. 447, 449-50 (1984). If Renfrew had been represented by a colleague of
her own firm, she would have been awarded fees at trial. See id.
34. Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1109, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
35. Id.
36. 48 Cal. 369 (1878).
37. Id. at 380.
38. See id. The opinion stated: "The action was brought and prosecuted by the plaintiff
personally. We do not think that the stipulation in the mortgage sued on, for counsel fee,
can apply where no counsel fee was paid by the plaintiff." Id.
39. 206 Cal. 473, 274 P. 968 (1929).
40. Id. at 474-75, 274 P. at 969.
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California statute, 4' but the supreme court cited Patterson as primary
authority and denied the fees. 2
In 1958, the California Court of Appeal for the Third District
followed the supreme court rulings in Patterson and Sten in the case
of O'Connell v. Zimmerman.43 The court denied legal fees to an
attorney-litigant in an action for specific performance of a contract.44
Although the California Code of Civil Procedure provided for an
award of legal fees, the court noted that the code only provided for
fees actually incurred by the prevailing party.45 Thus, an attorney
appearing in propria persona could not recover fees because the at-
torney had paid no fees nor incurred any obligation to pay fees.46
The holding in O'Connell denying fees to attorney-litigants remained
the rule until Consumers Lobby was heard by the California Supreme
Court in 1979. 7
B. Recent Trends
In Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, the California Supreme Court discussed the issue of attorney's
fees for attorney-litigants in dicta.48 The court held that an attorney
representing a group of ratepayers in a Public Utilities Commission
reparations hearing could be awarded fees although the attorney was
a member of the group.4 9 In a footnote, the court attacked past deci-
sions denying fees to attorney-litigants." The court reasoned that
41. Id. at 473, 274 P. at 969. The claim was brought under a prior provision of the Califor-
nia Code of Civil Procedure which provided for an award of legal fees in condemnation pro-
ceedings. Id. at 474, 274 P. at 969. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §1255(a) (repealed by 1975
Cal. Stat. c. 1275, §1 at 3409).
42. Id. at 474-75, 274 P. at 969.
43. 157 Cal. App. 2d 330, 337, 321 P.2d 161, 165 (1958).
44. Id. at 336-37, 321 P.2d at 165.
45. Id. at 337, 321 P.2d at 165. The claim was brought under section 386.6 of the Califor-
nia Code of Civil Procedure which provides for an award of attorneys fees in actions seeking
specific performance of contracts. Id. at 336-37, 321 P.2d at 165. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§386.6 (amended by 1974 Cal. Stat. c. 273, §1 at 498).
46. O'Connell at 337, 321 P.2d at 165. The modern rule was articulated as follows: "When
an attorney represents himself in an action he may not recover the reasonable value of his
fee, for he has paid no fee, nor incurred any liability to pay an attorney fee." Id.
47. 25 Cal. 3d 891, 603 P.2d 41, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1979).
48. id. at 915 n.13, 603 P.2d at 55 n.13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.13.
49. Id. at 913-15, 603 P.2d at 54-55, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
50. Id. at 915 n.13, 603 P.2d at 55 n.13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.13. The supreme court
stated:
Moreover, the logic of past decisions that do not allow an attorney to recover fees
when he appears on his own behalf is unclear. Although such an attorney does not
pay a fee or incur any financial liability therefor to another, his time spent in preparing
and presenting his case is not somehow rendered less valuable because he is repre-
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although the attorney neither paid nor incurred any fees, the time
spent was just as valuable as time spent rendering services to a third
party.5" Attorneys appearing in propria persona should therefore be
compensated whenever non-attorneys would be entitled to fees. 2
The rationale of Consumers Lobby has been applied by other courts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
held in Ellis v. Cassidy3 that an attorney appearing in propria per-
sona to defend against frivolous or harrassing claims may be awarded
legal fees." ' The purpose of the award in Ellis was to discourage
frivolous litigation.55 In addition, the attorney-litigant was required
to take time away from normal legal practice to defend the suit, suf-
fering a pecuniary loss.56 The court emphasized that the attorney did
not appear in propria persona to compensate for an inactive legal
practice, but rather had been forced to defend against frivolous claims
initiated by the opposing party.57 A continuing trend toward allow-
ing legal fees is discernable in recent California cases.
In Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 8 the California Court of Appeal
for the First District held that an attorney appearing in propria per-
sona in an inverse condemnation action could recover attorney's fees. 9
The court relied heavily on Ellis and Consumers Lobby, both of which
favored awarding fees to attorney-litigants. 0 The court concluded that
although no obligation to pay a fee was incurred, the attorney-litigant
spent considerable time and effort in researching, preparing, and
senting himself rather than a third party. Accordingly, it would appear he should
be compensated when he represents himself if he would otherwise be entitled to such
compensation, absent a showing in a particular case that such an award would place
his interests in conflict with those whom he represents.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court was also concerned that a bar to recovery of fees would create a wind.
fall to the opposing party at the expense of attorneys who represent themselves. See id. at
915, 603 P.2d at 55, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
53. 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980).
54. Id. at 230-31.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 231.
57. Id.
58. 150 Cal. App. 3d 1184, 198 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1984).
59. Id. at 1188-89, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50. The claim was brought under section 1036
of the California Code of Civil Procedure which allows recovery of legal expenses in inverse
condemnation actions. Id. at 1187, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 449. The holding of the court was framed
narrowly. "Thus, we determine that where, as here, an attorney acts pro se in prosecuting
an inverse condemnation action, such attorney is entitled to recover the reasonable value of
the professional services necessarily rendered during pretrial and trial proceedings." Id. at 1189,
190 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1036.
60. Leaf, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 1188-89, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50.
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presenting the case at trial. 6 ' The attorney's efforts had a substantial
economic value that could have been realized had the attorney been
representing a third party. Attorneys therefore should be compensated
whenever a non-attorney litigant would be awarded fees."
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. Applicability of the Ruling
Although Renfrew involved payment of fees pursuant to a represen-
tation agreement enforceable under section 1717 of the California Civil
Code, the reasoning of the court of appeal suggests a broad applica-
tion of the holding.63 The courts in Consumers Lobby, Ellis, Leaf,
and Renfrew expressed concerns about the inequities resulting from
denial of fees to attorneys representing themselves." The time spent
in preparation of cases represents a pecuniary loss for which an at-
torney would normally be compensated .6  Denial of fees also creates
a windfall for the opposing party who would otherwise be obligated
to pay legal expenses.6 6 The holding in Renfrew therefore would extend
beyond cases concerning representation agreements arising under sec-
tion 1717, and apply to any circumstance in which an attorney-litigant
would otherwise be entitled to an award for legal expenses. 67 For
example, attorneys should be awarded fees whenever the fees are pro-
vided by the statute giving rise to the action, and pursuant to section
1717 of the California Civil Code when a contract provides for an
award.
61. See id. at 1189, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
64. See Consumers Lobby, 25 Cal. 3d at 914-15, 603 P.2d at 55, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 138;
Ellis, 625 F.2d at 230-31; Leaf, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 1188-89, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50; Renfrew,
175 Cal. App. 3d at 1109, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
65. See Consumers Lobby, 25 Cal. 3d at 915 n.13, 603 P.2d at 55 n.13, 160 Cal. Rptr.
at 138 n.13; Ellis, 625 F.2d at 230-31; Leaf, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 1188-89, 198 Cal. Rptr.
at 449-50; Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1109, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
66. See Consumers Lobby, 25 Cal. 3d at 914-15, 603 P.2d at 55, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 138;
Ellis, 625 F.2d at 230-31; Leaf, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 1188-89, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50; Ren-
frew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1109, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
67. The dicta regarding attorney's fees by the California Supreme Court in Consumers
Lobby is entitled to great weight. See Smith v. Mt. Diablo Unified Sch. Dist., 56 Cal. App.
3d 412, 418, 128 Cal. Rptr. 572, 578 (1976). The language in Consumers Lobby clearly sup-
ports the proposition that "[an attorney) should be compensated when he represents himself
if he would otherwise be entitled to such compensation." See Consumers Lobby, 25 Cal. 3d
at 915 n.13, 603 P.2d at 55 n.13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.13 (dicta).
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B. Jurisdictional Scope of the Ruling
The ruling in Renfrew is the second holding at the appellate level
regarding legal fees in cases involving attorneys appearing in propria
persona.61 Although the Renfrew ruling represents the view of only
two appellate districts, a trend supported by the California Supreme
Court in Consumers Lobby can be discerned. 69 All three rulings use
the same rationale: No sound basis exists for denying awards of at-
torney's fees when attorneys appear in propria persona because
attorneys would otherwise be compensated if representing a client other
than themselves."0 The ruling in Renfrew may therefore be regarded
as representative of existing California law.
CONCLUSION
In Renfrew v. Loysen, the California Court of Appeal for the
Second District held that an attorney appearing in propria persona
could recover legal fees pursuant to a representation agreement. The
ruling is the latest development in a trend that is contrary to the long-
standing rule against awards of legal fees to attorneys who represent
themselves. The California Supreme Court first challenged the rule
in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com-
mission. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
awarded fees to an attorney who was forced to defend against frivolous
claims. Finally, the California Court of Appeal for the First District
in Leaf v. City of San Mateo established what appears to be the new
rule: Attorneys should be compensated when appearing in propria
persona if the services would be compensable in normal cases. The
rationale for this rule indicates that fees should be awarded whenever
a non-attorney under the same circumstances would have been allow-
ed an award. Although the new rule has been declared in only the
First and Second Appellate Districts, support for the decisions was
based on California Supreme Court dicta. The rule is therefore likely
to reflect a trend to be followed in all California jurisdictions.
Shelley M. Liberto
68. See Leaf, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1184, 198 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1984); supra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text.
69. See Consumers Lobby, 25 Cal. 3d at 915 n.13, 603 P.2d at 55 n.13, 160 Cal. Rptr.
at 138 n.13.
70. See Consumers Lobby, 25 Cal. 3d at 913-15, 603 P.2d at 54-55, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
137-38; Ellis, 625 F.2d at 230-31; Renfrew, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1109, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
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